The model by Nocco
					, 
						Antonella
2 The model
We consider a two-region economy (r = n, s) in which there are two types of workers, skilled
(h) and unskilled (l), indexed by j (j = h, l). The case r = n corresponds to the “north”
and r = s to the “south”. Skilled and unskilled workers have identical preferences and consume a
homogenous (traditional or agricultural) good, and several varieties of a (modern or manufactured)
good. Varieties of the modern good are produced under increasing returns and sold in markets
characterized by monopolistic competition. The agricultural good is produced under constant
returns by using only unskilled workers.
The total number of unskilled workers living in each region is the same and equal to L¯. Let H¯
be the total number of skilled workers. Skilled workers are employed only in the manufacturing
sector, and are perfectly mobile between the two regions. Hence, if they are employed in the two
regions, we know from Krugman (1991b) that their regional real wages must be equal. Unskilled
workers are interregionally immobile but are intersectorally mobile because they may be employed
in both sectors.
The production of any variety requires the use of all varieties of the manufactured good as
intermediate inputs. Trading the manufactured good between the two regions is costly, while
the traditional good is traded without cost. Finally, the eﬃciency of the technology available for
producing the manufactured good may diﬀer between the two regions. Furthermore, knowledge
spill-overs are present across regions.
2.1 Preferences and demand
A consumer in region r maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U(Qmr,Qar) = Q
µc
mrQ
1−µc
ar (1)
where Qmr is the quantity of the composite manufactured good and Qar is the quantity of the
agricultural good he/she consumes. The parameter µc is the share of consumers’ expenditure on
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manufactures with 0 < µc < 1.
The budget constraint is given by:
pmrQmr + parQar = yjr (2)
where yjr (j = l, h) is the income of a worker of type j in region r. While unskilled workers’
income in region r is given only by their wage (wlr), skilled workers’ income is given by the sum
of their wage (whr) and of a share in the profits earned by manufacturing firms located in their
region. This is because the total number of firms has not yet reached a long run equilibrium value
that ensures zero profits to all firms in the market. As will be seen below, the number of firms in
each region reaches its equilibrium value more slowly than all other variables.
Let par be the price of the agricultural good in region r, while pmr is the price index of
manufactured good in region r. The composite Qmr consumption good is obtained by aggregating
the diﬀerent varieties of the manufacturing good by means of a constant elasticity of substitution
sub-utility function:
Qmr =


nn+nsZ
i=1
Q
σ−1
σ
mir di


σ
σ−1
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties, whereas nn and ns are,
respectively, the mass of firms in the north and in the south.
Because all manufacturing firms in a particular region are homogenous, the price index of the
composite good in region r is:
pmr =
£
nrp
1−σ
r + nv(pvτ)
1−σ¤ 11−σ (3)
where r, v = n, s and v 6= r.
Maximizing (1) under the budget constraint (2), we obtain the demand schedules for the
agricultural good and for the composite manufactured good. Total consumers’ expenditure on the
manufactured good in region r (Emcr) is given by:
Emcr = µc(whrHr + wlrL¯+ nrπir) (4)
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whereHr and L¯ are, respectively, the number of mobile skilled workers and the number of immobile
workers employed in region r, while πir are profits realized by each firm in the same region.
However, in order to determine the total expenditure on the manufactured good in region r
(Emr), we must also consider firms expenditure (Emmr):
Emr = Emcr +Emmr (5)
2.2 Manufacturing sector
Each firm produces under increasing returns one variety of a diﬀerentiated good because consumers
have a preference for variety, and because there are no scope economies. A firm’s output can be
either directed towards local demand, or exported according to an iceberg trade cost. Firms in each
region are homogenous and their mass nr is endogenously determined. Producing the quantity
Qmir of each variety i requires both a fixed and a variable amount of a composite productive
input Imir, which is defined below. While the fixed amount α is the same in the two regions, the
variable amount β/ar may diﬀer. Specifically, the more productive region is characterized by a
higher value of ar.
The production function of the firm supplying variety i is given by:
Qmir =
ar(Imir − α)
β
(6)
where α,β, ar > 0. The magnitude ar reflects the level of development of the technology in region
r. For notational simplicity, we normalize the value of ar in region n to 1:
an = 1 (7)
In the same spirit as Krugman’s and Venables’ (1995), we define the input Imir as a Cobb-Douglas
composite of three production factors: two primary factors (skilled and unskilled workers) and
one intermediate factor (the manufactured composite good Dmir):
Imir =
HγmirL
1−γ−µ
mir D
µ
mir
(1− γ − µ)1−γ−µµµγγ (8)
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where 0 < µ < 1, 0 < γ < 1 and 1− γ − µ > 0.
For simplicity, we assume that the elasticity of substitution with which varieties enter con-
sumers’ utility function is the same as that with which they enter firms’ production function.
Therefore, the composite good Dmir demanded by each firm i has the same shares of the compos-
ite good Qmr demanded by consumers.
Finally, the minimization of the total cost of production under the constraint given by (6) and
(8) yields the cost function of the firm supplying variety i:
TCmir = p
µ
mrw
γ
hrw
1−γ−µ
lr
µ
β
ar
Qmir + α
¶
(9)
Since µ, γ and 1− γ−µ respectively represent the shares of firms’ total production costs devoted
to the composite good, to skilled and unskilled workers, firms’ total expenditure on manufactures
in region r (Emmr) is given by:
Emmr = µnrTCmir (10)
2.3 Equilibrium
The traditional good is produced under constant returns, employing only unskilled workers:
Qar = Lar
Given the assumptions of perfect competition and absence of trade costs, the price of this good is
equal to the wage of unskilled workers:
par = wlr
Moreover, when the traditional good is produced in both regions, it is sold at the same price, and
wages received by unskilled workers in the two regions are equal. The traditional good is chosen
as the numéraire: par = 1.
Consumers’ and firms’ demand functions in region r for varieties produced in the same region
or imported from region v, are obtained by the minimization of the expenditure on manufacturing
goods under the constraint given by the aggregation of all varieties in the composite good. Let us
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consider, for the moment, prices and quantities regardless of the location of production. So, we
must solve the following problem:
min
Qmi
nZ
i=1
piQmidi s.t. Qm =


nZ
i=1
Qρmidi


1
ρ
where 0 < ρ = σ−1σ < 1. pi is the price of variety i, and ρ represents the intensity of the preference
for variety in manufactured goods.
The solution of the constrained minimization problem yields the following demand function:
Qmi =
p−σi
p1−σm
Em (11)
where the total expenditure on manufacturing goods (Em) is:
Em = pmQm
However, we should notice that the existence of trade costs implies that the price of an imported
variety is higher than the one paid in the region in which it is produced. More precisely, in order
to import one unit of a variety, τ > 1 units have to be shipped. Therefore, the demand function
for the locally produced variety i in region r (Qrdmir) is given by:
Qrdmir =
p−σir
p1−σmr
Emr
Similarly, the demand function for the imported variety i produced in region v (Qrdmiv) is given by:
Qrdmiv =
(τpiv)
−σ
p1−σmr
τEmr
where r, v = n, s and v 6= r. Hence, the aggregate demand (Qdmir) for a firm producing variety i
in region r is:
Qdmir = Q
rd
mir +Q
vd
mir = p
−σ
ir
µ
1
p1−σmr
Emr +
τ1−σ
p1−σmv
Emv
¶
(12)
Each firm producing in region r maximizes profits (πir) under the aggregate demand function
(12). It is readily verified that each firm sets a price with a constant mark-up over the marginal
cost MCmir:
pir =
σ
σ − 1MCmir =
µ
σβ
(σ − 1) ar
¶
pµmrw
γ
hrw
1−γ−µ
lr (13)
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Thereafter we will drop the suﬃx i from the price of each variety produced in region r because all
firms in a particular region are assumed to be equal.
Profits of a firm producing in region r are given by:
πir = pµmrw
γ
hrw
1−γ−µ
lr
µ
β
(σ − 1) ar
Qmir − α
¶
(14)
Following Puga (1999), without loss of generality, the values of α and β can be chosen as follows:
α =
1
σ
and β =
σ − 1
σ
so that profits may be rewritten as follows:
πir = pµmrw
γ
hrw
1−γ−µ
lr
1
σ
µ
1
ar
Qmir − 1
¶
(15)
The manufacturing sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. When there is free
entry and exit, profits are equal to zero at the long run equilibrium. Therefore, the long run
equilibrium price of each variety is equal to the average cost of production ACmir:
pr =
TCmir
Qmir
= ACmir (16)
Equation (13) together with equation (16) allows us to compute the long run equilibrium size of
each firm in region r:
Q∗mir =
αar (σ − 1)
β
= ar
Given the normalization above, profits are equal to zero for northern and southern firms when
their production levels are respectively:
Q∗min = 1 and Q
∗
mis = as (17)
The free entry and exit condition implies that the following expression must be satisfied at a long
run equilibrium:
nrπir = 0 πir 0 0 nr ≥ 0
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When skilled workers are employed in both regions, we know from Krugman (1991b) that
regional real wages of skilled workers are equal at the long run equilibrium:
whn
p
µc
mn
=
whs
p
µc
ms
(18)
Moreover, the full employment of skilled workers requires that:
H¯ = Hn +Hs (19)
Total wages of skilled workers in region r are equal to the share of total production costs of the
region:
Hrwhr = γTCmirnr (20)
Finally, by equating total unskilled workers’ demand from the agricultural and the manufacturing
sector to their regional supply, we obtain the market clearing condition for unskilled workers in
region r:
wlrL¯ = (1− γ − µ)TCmirnr + (1− µc)λr(whrHr + wlrL¯+ nrπir) (21)
+(1− µc) (1− λv)(whvHv + wlvL¯+ nvπiv)
where λr and λv are, respectively, the shares of agricultural expenditure devoted to domestic
production by residents in region r and v, with r 6= v.
3 Technological evolution
In this paper we want to investigate what the interregional distribution of the economic activity
becomes if interregional knowledge spill-overs take place only when the initial technological gap
is not too wide, and when trade costs, taken as a proxy for the obstacles to interaction between
firms of diﬀerent regions, are suﬃciently low. Therefore, the critical force lies in the ability of
firms located in the receiving regions to use the flow of additional knowledge.
In fact, Verspagen (1991, p. 362-363) points out that the learning abilities of a lagging region or
country “depend both on an intrinsic capability, and on its technological distance from the leading
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